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NOTES
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-AN
ANALYSIS OF DUE PROCESS
One of the more vexing problems of corporate law today is the de-
termination of when a foreign corporation is "doing business" for the pur-
pose of being subjected to the jurisdiction of a state other than that of its
incorporation or in which it has named an agent for service of process.'
When suit is instituted in such a state, the corporation may raise the
defense that the court lacks jurisdiction. This may be founded on either
or both of two standards: (1) local state law, usually statutory, which
provides the criteria for jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations,2 (2)
the constitutional guarantee of due process which limits any court's power
to exercise jurisdiction.3
In most states, the jurisdictional statute provides that the corporation
may be subjected to suit if it is "doing business" within the state.4 In
general, the courts have construed this standard as being more restrictive
of the court's jurisdictional power than would be demanded by due process
considerations.5 However, some states have rejected the standard of
"doing business" for more specific statutory terms,6 which have tended to
1. The volume of decisions is illustrative of the failure of the legislatures and
the courts to find an understandable solution to the problem. In 1954 alone, the
West Reporter system printed 35 opinions on motions to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction by corporations; of these, 26 were decisions on appeal.
2. The state may not choose to exercise its jurisdiction to the full extent of its
powers under the Constitution. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (1952); Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 1954);
Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear Co., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948). In the federal
courts, state law is controlling if jurisdiction of the subject matter is based upon
diversity of citizenship. Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1953); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948). See
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947). Contra, Hedrick v. Canadian
Pacific Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio 1939). When a federal right is claimed,
however, state law is not controlling. Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F.
Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951). See Angel v. Bullington, supra.
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). A corporation is a "person" for
this purpose. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1937).
4. See, e.g., Aiz. CoDE: ANN. § 21-306 (1939) ; InAHO CODE AN. § 5-507 (1948);
M& REv. STAT. AN. c. 112, § 19 (1954).
5. See Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Bomze
v Nardis Sportswear Co, 165 F2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948). Compare Lutz v. Foster &
Kester Co., 367 Pa. 125, 79 A2d 222 (1951), with International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); compare Kahn v. Maico, 216 F.2d 233 (4th Cir.
1954), with Western Gas Appliances, Inc. v. Servel, Inc., 257 P.2d 950 (Utah 1953).
6. Two states provide for suits by residents in any cause of action arising out
of a contract made within the state or liability incurred for acts done within the state.
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expand the court's jurisdictional power under state law.7 A few have
reached a similar result by a more liberal interpretation of the "doing
business" statute.8 In either case, the state's natural desire to protect its
citizens by extending its state standards of jurisdiction may result in the
exercise of jurisdiction which deprives the corporation of due process of
law.
In determining the extent of the court's constitutional power to render
a judgment against the foreign corporation, the more widely accepted test
has been whether the corporation has had sufficient contacts with the state
to warrant the inference that it is present there.9 Since the foreign cor-
poration is only a fictional entity created by the law, it can never be present
in the physical sense of a person being present. A corporation must act
through its agents; the myriad of forms which these activities may take
within the state reveals the fictional and impractical characteristics of such
a rule. This has led to the determination that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion comports with the requirements of due process if the corporation has
such contacts with the state of the forum to make it reasonable that it defend
the particular suit which is brought there.'0 Although this is a less fic-
tional statement of the considerations involved, it gives little guidance to
the corporation desirous of avoiding suit in a distant state or to a plaintiff
uncertain of the jurisdiction of the local courts.
Perhaps little more can be expected since the determination of whether
due process has been violated turns on a balance of conflicting considera-
tions which vary in accordance with the facts presented. On the one side
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §88 (1951); VT. Rv. STAT. §1562 (1947). Some have
provided for jurisdiction over corporations which do "any business or perform any
character of work or service in this state." See, e.g., Aiu. STAT. ANN. §27-340
(1947) ; Miss. CoDE ANN. § 1437 (1942). Pennsylvania has defined doing business
by statute as ". . . the entry of any corporation into this Commonwealth for the
doing of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit
or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act in this Commonwealth
for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-1011 (Purdon Supp. 1954).
7. See Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955);
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950); Smyth
v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A2d 664 (1951).
8. See London's, Inc. v. Mack Shirt Corp., 114 F. Supp. 883 (D. Mass. 1953);
Duraladd Products v. Superior Court, 285 P.2d 699 (Cal. 1955); S. Howes Co.
v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P2d 655 (Okla. 1954).
9. The history of the theoretical justifications for rendering in personam judg-
ments against foreign corporations has been long and complex. The three pre-
vailing theories were: consent, St. Claire v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) ; doing business so as to justify
the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the state's jurisdiction,
St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); doing business so as to
warrant the inference that it is present there, Bank of America v. Whitney Bank,
261 U.S. 171 (1923) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 23 U.S. 579 (1914).
For a history of the applicable theory, see Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business,
25 COLu-m. L. REv. 1018, 1028 (1925).
10. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). In
this decision the Court rejected the presence theory as fiction. Is is significant that
the Court did not use the language of "doing business." It has been suggested that
the phrase may have outlived its usefulness. GOODriCH, Coymacrs OF LAW 207
(3d ed. 1949).
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are the inconveniences which suit would impose on the corporation." An
estimate of these inconveniences will generally be found in the costs and
burden of transporting evidenceP into the claimant's jurisdiction in addi-
tion to the necessity of local counsel to conduct the litigation. Opposed
to this consideration is the interest of the state in the assertion of juris-
diction over foreign corporations which are allowed to do business within
its borders. Two fundamental considerations are involved in determining
the extent of the state's interest. First, the corporation's activities may
subject the residents of the state to a risk of physical harm or economic
loss.13 Unless the corporation can be compelled to defend the resident's
claim within the state, the costs and inconveniences of litigating in a foreign
forum may make the resident's use of legal process unfeasible. 14 Secondly,
by exercising the privilege of dealing with state residents, the corporation
may receive substantial economic benefit which is in part made possible
by the protection which state law gives to the corporation's activities.'5
Cases decided on the constitutional standard of due process can be
analyzed as falling into two major categories. The first is whether the
activities of the corporation's agents within the state are a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction over the particular suit involved. This involves a con-
sideration of the evidentiary burden which various types of suits may
impose on the corporation and the countervailing considerations of the
character of the activity involved in terms of the benefits which the cor-
poration has received and the risk which it has presented to state residents.
The analysis of the law of due process is then presented as a balance be-
tween these two competing factors. In the second category are cases in
which the claim to jurisdiction primarily rests on the corporation's dealings
11. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945);
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
12. The term "evidence" is reified in this Note to facilitate reference to all forms
of evidence whether it be in the form of eyewitnesses, documents or physical
objects.
13. Jurisdiction over the non-resident motorist is generally said to rest on the
police power of the state to promote the public safety. Hess v. Palowski, 274 U.S.
352, 356 (1927) ; Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-resident Motorists, 32 MiCH.
L. REv. 325, 327 (1934). The doctrine would seem to extend to one who does,
acts or owns things in a state which are of a sort dangerous to life or property.
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §23 (1942). This principle has been applied to non-
resident owners of property, Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D.&C. 61 (Phila. C.P.
1938), to the sale of securities, Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623 (1935), and to the sale of insurance. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950). See GOODiCH, CONFLICr OF LAws 203 (3d ed. 1949).
14. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 64849 (1950); Rail-
road Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65, 84 (1870); Scott, Jurisdiction over
Nonresidents Doing Btsuiness Within, a State, 32 HAlv. L. REv. 871, 888 (1919).
15. Among other things, the corporation is usually given access to the courts
of the state to enforce its rights. However, if the corporation is doing a sufficient
amount of business within the state, its failure to qualify in accordance with the
state law will prohibit it from instituting suit in the courts of that state. See
St. Avit v. Kettle River Co., 216 Fed. 872 (8th Cir. 1914); Buffalo Refrigeration
Machine Co. v. Penn H. & P. Co., 178 Fed. 696 (3d Cir. 1910). As a general
proposition, however, a higher degree of doing business is required for this purpose
than for the purpose of subjecting the corporation to jurisdiction. See Isaacs, An
Aiwlysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 1018, 1024-25, 1041 (1925).
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with local businesses rather than the presence of the corporation's agents.
In this circumstance, there is little question that the activities of the local
business would be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction if the business were
operated by agents of the corporation. The issue to be considered is when
the business of local firms or subsidiaries is to be considered the business of
the foreign corporation.
THE PRESENCE OF AGENTS
Character of the Suit: The Evidentiary Burden
The evidentiary burden which suit in a foreign jurisdiction may impose
on the corporation is probably the principal factor weighing against the
reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction. This depends largely on
the relationship between the agent's presence and the claimant's cause
of action. When the claim arises directly out of the agent's acts, the cor-
poration's evidentiary burden may be insignificant since the testimony of
the agent, who is already in the state of the forum, will constitute a sub-
stantial part of the corporation's case. This is less likely when the agent's
activity is not an issue of litigation, but is only indirectly related to the
plaintiff's claim, and when the suit has no relation to the corporation's
business within the state, the agent's presence is of no relevance to where
the evidence may be. Thus it may be helpful in analyzing the burden on
the foreign corporation to consider the cases initially, as in the following
paragraphs, in terms of direct claims, indirect claims and unrelated claims.16
It will be observed later that the amount of corporate activity within the
state which is required to support jurisdiction may depend largely on
which type of suit is in question.
Direct Claims
In many suits against the foreign corporation, the primary issues of
litigation may involve principally what the agents did within the state.
Typical of this type of case is the tort action against the corporation for
the wrongful act of the agent within the state under the agency doctrine
of respondeat superior. In Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co.,17 for
example, the claimant's house was damaged through the agent's negligence
in the course of reroofing. Since the evidence as to both negligence and
damages was within the state, the suit would impose little evidentiary
burden on the corporation.
16. By use of the terms direct, indirect and unrelated it is not intended to add
to the law distinguishing direct from indirect effects of acts. Although Lord Kenyon
may have found these terms useful in distinguishing the action of trespass from an
action on the case in Day v. Edwards, S.T.R. 648 (1794), it is doubtful if such a
distinction would be useful in this context. They are intended only as shorthand
statements of three general classes of cases which involve varying degrees of evi-
dentiary burden to the corporation.
17. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
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The United States Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction on the basis of
a different type of direct claim in International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington.18 In that case, suit was brought by the State of Washington
to collect unpaid contributions to the state's unemployment compensation
fund. The corporation's "presence" for purposes of jurisdiction, as well
as the state's claim for payment, was based on the activities of a varying
number of from eleven to thirteen salesmen who were soliciting orders from
prospective customers at prices and on terms fixed by the corporation.
Since the issues to be litigated directly concerned the agents' activities,
i.e., payments due to the state unemployment -fund because of the agent's
acts, little evidence from outside the jurisdiction would be required other
than documents relevant to the amounts owed by the corporation. In this
instance state residents might be relied upon to give unbiased testimony,
and since the salesmen were residents of the state, the use of their testi-
mony would be of no added burden to the corporation.
As a general rule, it is likely that whenever the acts of an agent within
the state are a primary issue of litigation, the corporation's evidentiary
burden will be insignificant. However, situations may arise in which the
defense of a claim stemming from the agent's acts within the state impose
a heavy burden on the foreign corporation. Even in tort actions, which
would seem most likely to present a minor evidentiary problem to the out-
of-state corporation, the locus of the evidence may vary in some instances.
In Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.,19 for example, suit in Mary-
land against a Texas corporation was based on the misrepresentation of its
agent. The subject of the misrepresentation was the safety of tools made
by a Massachusetts firm when used in conjunction with the products of the
defendant. Although the exercise of jurisdiction was upheld, the suit may
have involved a serious evidentiary burden to the corporation. Since the
alleged misrepresentation took place in Maryland, some of the corporation's
evidence would be there. On the other hand, the determination of whether
the agent was really at fault may well turn on the issue of whether the
Massachusetts firm had been negligent in manufacturing the tool in ques-
tion. Since jurisdiction over the Massachusetts firm could not be ob-
tained,2 0 a heavy burden would fall on the Texas corporation.
Indirect Claims
With the exception of tort claims arising from vicarious liability, the
suit by the private litigant rarely falls within the category of direct claims.
In many instances, the subject matter of suit is only indirectly related to
the agent's activity within the state. In this type of claim, the agent's
testimony will be a minor part of the corporation's evidence, if indeed it is
relevant at all.
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
20. The Massachusetts firm had only one agent in the state who talked to
prospective customers but rarely took orders.
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This is particularly true in actions of this category which involve per-
sonal injury or property damage. In this type of case, there is no issue
of vicarious liability, and the agent's acts are not the gravamen of the
plaintiff's action. However, the bulk of the evidence is likely to be in the
claimant's district. In Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co.,2 1 for example,
suit was instituted for breach of the defendant's warranty that its dye was
safe for use if its directions were followed. Although there were agents
of the defendant in the state promoting the sale of their employer's product,
the claimant had no dealings with these agents; he had purchased the dye
from an independent local retailer. Since the only issues of litigation would
involve the claimant's use of the dye and the resulting damages, nearly
all the evidence would be in the state. In a few cases, however, defending
this type of suit may be burdensome to the corporation. For example, if
the suit in Schilling had been based on the defendant's negligence in the
manufacturing process, the evidence as to damages would be in the claim-
ant's state, but all the evidence relevant to liability probably would have
to be transported into the state. In either case, it must be noted that the
presence of the selling agent is in no way related to the locus of the cor-
poration's evidence.
In the bulk of contract actions which do not primarily involve per-
sonal injury or property damage, the agent's presence may be similarly
unrelated to where the evidence may be. His testimony would be of value
primarily in cases in which he made or breached the contract within the
state, but even if the breach of the contract is at issue, the agent's testimony
may be of little value. In Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co.,2 for
example, a Panamanian corporation refused to accept the vessels it had
contracted to purchase from a Maryland company on the ground that the
conditions imposed by the United States Maritime Administration went
beyond the conditions to which it had assented in the contract of saie.
Agents had entered the state to negotiate the contract and to inspect the
vessels. However, the only issue of litigation was the construction of a
written contract and the conditions imposed by the Maritime Administra-
tion. Much of the evidence on this point consisted in letters from the
Administration, and in any event, it would be easier for the defendant to
litigate in Maryland than in Panama due to the location of the Administra-
tion's personnel.
A more productive analysis of the locus of the evidence may be made
in terms of whether the contract has been performed by either party, since
the bulk of the evidence is likely to be where the goods are or where the
services were rendered. If the defendant corporation has bought and re-
ceived goods from the claimant, it would be subject to a large evidentiary
burden in establishing such defenses as the failure of the claimant's per-
formance to conform to the contract. On the other hand, if the defendant
corporation is the seller instead of the buyer and delivered goods to the
21. 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W2d 907 (1953).
22. 107 A.2d 357 (Md. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
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claimant, the evidence as to the adequacy of that performance is likely to
be in the claimant's jurisdiction. It should be noted, however, that when
the claimant is to bear the risk of loss in shipment, liability may hinge on
the condition of the goods when they were shipped by the defendant
corporation.2
In'a few instances, the agent's presence within the state may place him
in a position to be a valuable witness for the corporation even though his
acts did not directly give rise to the contract or the litigation in question.
When the contract requires services to be performed by agents within the
state or where they have investigated claims of the failure of defendant's
performance under a contract, a suit on the contract may involve little
evidentiary burden to the corporation. In many cases, the terms of the
contract would be documentary, and the agents may be relied upon, at least
in part, to testify on behalf of the defendant as to the basis of the resident's
claim.
Unrelated Claims
In some instances, suits may be instituted even though the claimant's
cause of action has no relation to the business carried on within the state.
In this case, the evidence which the corporation must present in order to
defend the suit will nearly always be in other jurisdictions.24 Consequently
this type of claim is more likely than either the direct or unrelated claim to
impose a sizeable burden on the corporation to defend. Vilter Mfg. Co. v.
Rolaff 25 is a typical case. Suit for the unpaid balance of a patent royalty
account was instituted in Missouri where the defendant maintained offices
for the purpose of soliciting sales, installing goods, handling complaints and
receiving payments. Since these activities were not related in any way to
the royalty account, it is nearly certain that the corporation would be forced
to transport all of its evidence from outside the state to defend against a
claim based on that account. Although much of the evidence in this case
may have been documentary, many unrelated suits are brought for personal
injuries,2 6 in which, by and large, the evidence is testimonial and not
documentary.
Character of the Activity: Benefit From and Risk to Local Residents
The consideration balanced against the disinclination of the foreign
corporation to defend against claims in one of its outlying areas of busi-
ness activity is the interest of the state in the assertion of jurisdiction.
23. See UNnoMus SALES Acr § 22.
24. But see Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952),
discussed in text at note 85 infra.
25. 110 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1940).
26. E.g., Maichok v. Bertha-Consumer's Co., 25 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1928);
Satterfield v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 128 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Pickthall
v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 73 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Koninklijke
Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297
(1951).
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Regardless of how slight the corporation's evidentiary burden may be, no
state may make a binding judgment in personam against a corporate de-
fendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or relations.27  Occasional
acts by agents within the state generally have been held to be insufficient
contacts with the state of the forum to support the assertion of jurisdic-
tion.28  Other acts, because of their character and circumstances of com-
mission have been deemed sufficient to subject the corporation to suits
arising from those acts,29 and in some instances, the corporation's business
within the state has been considered so substantial as to render the cor-
poration "present" for purposes of all suits 80
The character of the activity of the foreign corporation is of dual sig-
nificance. If it results in substantial benefits to the corporation, it is likely
to be reasonable for the state to compel the corporation to defend within
the state in return for the protection of state law which made this gain
possible.8 ' If it presents a great risk of harm to state residents, the state
has a greater interest in forcing the corporation to respond in suit for those
obligations arising from that activity. 2
Solicitation and Sale of Goods
The activities of salesmen, whether they make the actual contract
themselves or merely solicit orders for the goods to be accepted by cor-
porate agents in another state, are a frequently urged basis of jurisdiction
since this is likely to result in a large economic benefit to the corporation.
Whether the agents sell to local distributors or to the ultimate consumer,
the corporation's goods are made readily available to state residents-thus
substantially increasing the corporation's sales volume. The economic
benefit derived from this activity may easily be analyzed in terms of sales
volume. In International Shoe, for example, the payment of total conmnis-
sions in the amount of more than $31,000 each year 3 indicates that the
corporation received a considerable economic gain from the activities of the
soliciting agents. However, the volume of sales should not be the only
27. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
28. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923) (periodic
purchasing trips); Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233,
238 (5th Cir. 1953) (installation); Miller v. Tulsa Petroleum Co., 117 F. Supp.
359 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (contract negotiations-bookkeeping done in state).
29. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (use of mails to
sell insurance); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (sale
of several securities).
30. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (held
directors meetings, kept bank accounts, made stock transfers, paid salaries, purchased
machinery and generally directed corporate affairs); Maichok v. Bertha-Consumer's
Co., 25 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1928) ("substantial business") ; Kopenhafer v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 106 N.J.L. 530, 148 Atl. 629 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930) ("doing business").
31. The Court has stressed the amount of financial return to the corporation.
See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 646 (1950); International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
32. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
33. 326 U.S. at 313.
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criterion. Whether sales have been made or not, by exercising the oppor-
tunity to solicit state residents, the corporation is able to lay a foundation
for future sales. At least when these acts are in contemplation of more
extensive business dealings within the state,8 4 the fortuitous fact that the
claimant was injured before the corporation developed extensive marketing
outlets should be of no relevance, since the first act of business is as im-
portant as any other in the development of sales within the state.
Solicitation and Sale of Insurance
The fact that the corporation has not received or does not stand to
receive a considerable financial return from its activities within the state,
however, is not determinative of when jurisdiction should be asserted since
the danger of economic harm which the business in question presents to
state residents clearly varies the requirements of due process.8 5 Perhaps
insurance is the dearest example. The contract of insurance involves
continuing relationships and obligations with resident insureds, and in
consequence, involves a high risk of litigation. Moreover, a large proportion
of claims, especially those involving sickness and injury benefits, are rarely
large enough that the policy holder can afford suit in a foreign state. To
deny jurisdiction in the claimant's state would subject the resident to con-
siderable economic injury since this would place the insurer in a position
to force a settlement favorable to it even though losses can be tried more
conveniently in the policy holder's district where the witnesses would most
likely live and where claims for losses presumably would be investigated.38
Purchasing Compared With Selling
When suit arises as a result of a sale by a local resident to the foreign
corporation's purchasing agents, there may be a less effective basis of juris-
diction than if the foreign company was the seller3T Since the defendant-
purchasing corporation would only rarely be subject to a liability other than
for failure to pay the price of the goods, the resident's burden of bringing
suit in the defendant's state of incorporation or its principal place of busi-
ness would not be significant. Most of the evidence he would need to
support his claim is embodied in documents so that there would probably
be no necessity to transport numbers of witnesses to a distant court. On
the other hand, for the purchasing corporation to establish, in the plaintiff's
state, defenses such as the failure of the goods to conform to the contract
may involve a considerable evidentiary burden. In the case of the defend-
ant-selling corporation, it is more probable that the evidence on the ques-
tion of adequacy of performance is in the claimant's jurisdiction so that
34. Compare Pennsylvania's statutory definition of "doing business." See note
6 supra.
35. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
36. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).
37. Compare Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923),
with International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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to compel the claimant to present that evidence in the defendant's juris-
diction may well act as a bar to relief. For this reason it may be less
reasonable for the state to compel the purchasing corporation to defend
within the state in order to protect the state's residents than in the case of
the selling corporation. However, it should be noted that the economic
value derived from the purchasing activity may be just as important as the
selling phase of the business, since the advantageous purchase is an integral
part of the corporation's margin of profit.
Activities Arising Out of the Contract
Acts done pursuant to the performance of the contract present a more
varied combination of the elements of danger and benefits. When the re-
quired performance is similar to construction work, both elements are
clearly present. Large amounts of money are involved, heavy equipment
moved into the state, local workmen employed, and a substantial amount
of goods purchased from local merchants8 s The extent of the activity and
the risks it involves indicate that a large number of residents are sub-
jected to the threat of both physical and economic harm. However, small
contracts of installation or repair may affect no one other than the con-
tracting party and may involve little or no risk of personal injury or prop-
erty damage. Unlike solicitation, the performance of a single contract
within the state is unlikely to produce large amounts of revenue for the
corporation. However, if many sales have been made to state residents,
even a single adjustment of a claim may be essential to maintaining the
corporation's good will within the state.8 9
The Balance of the Conflicting Interests
The relative weight to be given to the inconveniences which suit would
impose on the corporation as opposed to the extent to which the corpora-
tion's activities have benefited it and endangered state residents is the crux
of the due process issue. As a tool of analysis, the discussion is organized
according to the type of suit at issue as indicative of the evidentiary burden
which the suit would impose on the corporation.
To clarify what is in issue, it should be noted that this problem of
balancing is a much different problem from that of the application of the
principle of forum non conveniens.4° That determination rests primarily
on which forum would be the more convenient for the litigation of the suit
38. See, e.g., Electrical Equipment Co. v. Hamm, 217 F2d 656 (8th Cir.
1954); McMaster v. Robinson's Women's Apparel, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 99 (D. Neb.
1942).
39. See the discussion of S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P2d 655
(Okla. 1954), probable juris. noted, 348 U.S. 949 (1955), at pp. 396-97 infra. This case
has been settled. Letter from Chal Wheeler, attorney for claimant, Aug. 23, 1955, to
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, on file in Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania Law School.
40. Buet see the opinion of L. Hand, J. in Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pacific Ry.,
166 F.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1948).
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in question, when there are two or more jurisdictions which would have
the power to render a judgment.41 However, whether a particular juris-
diction has the constitutional power to render that judgment depends on
whether it is reasonable for the state to compel the corporation to defend
within the state regardless of the convenience of the particular claimant
involved,42 and regardless of the fact that, as between the parties to the
litigation, it may be more convenient for the suit to be litigated in some
other jurisdiction.4
Direct Claims
When the suit arises directly out of the agent's acts within the state so
that the acts of the agent are the primary issues of litigation, the assertion
of jurisdiction would only rarely be termed unreasonable. 44 Even if the
agents were there only temporarily, the burden of transporting them into
the state to testify may not be significantly great. In Johns v. Bay State
Abrasive Products Co.45 a slight amount of solicitation was held sufficient
to sustain an action for a tort committed by an agent even though a con-
siderable amount of evidence from outside the state may have been required
to defend the action. Similarly, in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Co.46 jurisdiction was upheld over a suit for damages to the claimant's
home which were incurred in the course of its reroofing by the foreign
corporation even though this was the corporation's only contact with the
state. Although jurisdiction has rarely been sustained merely on the basis
of a single tort,47 it is probable that due process would not be violated in
this type of suit if the agent was engaged in any activity profitable to the
corporation whether it be purchasing, solicitation or performance of a
contract.
41. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
42. In International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945), the
Court refers only to the inconvenience to the corporation as a relevant consideration.
Id. at 317. Although inconvenence to the resident to bring suit in another state may
be relevant in estimating the extent of the danger which the corporation's activity
presents to state residents, it would only seem relevant to consider the extent of the
burden to claimants in general. See the Court's discussion of the burden which
suit in a foreign forum would impose on a resident insured in Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).
43. The court may have jurisdiction over the foreign corporation; yet, if suit
would be extremely burdensome to the corporation, the suit may be dismissed on
grounds of convenience. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946);
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
44. 326 U.S. at 319 (1945).
45. 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
46. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
47. The commission of a single tort has generally been held insufficient to
sustain jurisdiction. McClelland v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 10 N.J.
Misc. 156, 158 Atl. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Cmnpare Mississippi Wood Preserving
Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1953), with Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v.
Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615 (1951); cf. Johns v. Bay State Abrasive
Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950). Contra, Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
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Indirect Claims
When the relationship between the agent's acts and the claimant's
cause of action is more indirect, however, perhaps a greater degree of
corporate activity is to be required. In this type of suit, the character of
the activity which forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim to jurisdiction
would seem to be determinative of the actual extent of the activity required.
Solicitation
Although jurisdiction has generally been upheld when contracts of
sale are actually made within the state,48 for many years it was generally
accepted that personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation could not
be asserted on the basis of mere solicitation.49  This tradition was broken
by the Supreme Court's decision of International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington.50 In that case, the corporation's only contact with the state
was through the solicitation of sales by eleven to thirteen salesmen. The
Court was of the opinion that since the obligation sued upon arose out of
the salesmen's activities, the large volume of business done and the benefits
received through the laws of the state were sufficient contacts ".. . to
make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of
fair play and substantial justice . . ." ' to permit the state to enforce
the obligation incurred.
Although the suit in International Shoe arose directly out of the sales-
men's activities, the rejection of the "mere solicitation" rule would not seem
to be limited to that type of case. In Schilling v. Roux Distribution Co.,
52
for example, the defendant maintained a district manager in Minnesota to
direct seven to ten other employees who encouraged the sale of the de-
fendant's product. Suit for breach of warranty was instituted in that state
for personal injuries arising from its use. Although the claimant had pur-
chased the product from an independent retailer, jurisdiction was upheld
48. See Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955);
Satterfield v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 128 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); National
Can Co. v. Weirton Steel Co., 314 Ill. 280, 145 N.E. 389 (1924).
49. See note 50 infra.
50. See Note, 16 U. Cxi. L. REv. 523, 526 (1949). The rule that solicitation
alone is not a basis of jurisdiction perhaps originated in Green v. Chicago B. & Q.
Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
579 (1914), the Green case was termed extreme, but the Court found something
more than mere solicitation in the facts before it. For a history of the doctrine and
a reluctant application, see Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1943). The Green case is no longer law on its facts. Compare Green v.
Chicago B. & Q. Ry., supra, wsith Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 157 F.2d 674 (6th
Cir. 1946). See Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955).
Most courts have interpreted the decision as rejecting the mere solicitation rule.
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955);
Allegue v. Gulf & South American S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953). A few
have interpreted it to be merely an application of the rule. See, e.g., Goldstein
v. Chicago R.I. & P.R.R., 93 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.N.Y. 1950); Klein v. Sunbeam
Corp., 47 Del. 485, 94 A.2d 385 (Super. Ct. 1951).
51. 326 U.S. at 320.
52. 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953).
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on the basis of the activities of these agents which produced a large volume
of sales for the corporation.
The reasons for the rejection of the "mere solicitation" rule are quite
compelling whether the claim is direct or indirect, since the additional
activity required was neither relevant to the locus of the evidence nor a
good indication of the extent of the benefits received by the corporation.
Under the old rule, little more than solicitation was required to sustain
jurisdiction. In some cases, solicitation plus maintaining an office r or
warehouse 54 may have been sufficient. Solicitation plus making deliveries,5
collections,56 gathering material for publication 67 or handling claims 5 8 may
have had a like effect. Without any of these additional activities solicitation
may be just as productive of business as it is with them.59 When the selling
phase of the business is segregated from other activities, whether or not
the segregation be done intentionally to avoid local jurisdiction, the refusal
to subject the corporation to suit on the basis of mere solicitation may give
the corporation a considerable immunity from liability. As a matter of
policy such an immunity should not be permitted when the extent of the
activity indicates that the resulting economic benefits to the corporation are
substantial.
Although the suit which arises indirectly out of the agent's activity
is likely to involve a greater evidentiary burden than is involved in direct
claims when the soliciting activity is continuous, there would seem to be
little reason to deny the assertion of jurisdiction. Since whether the agent
sells directly to the consumer or sells at wholesale to local retailers, his
presence is unlikely to be related to where the evidence may be, the fact
that the claimant never dealt directly with the soliciting agent would also
be immaterial. By making its goods readily available to state residents the
corporation has received a substantial economic benefit and to some extent
has subjected the residents of the state to risk of economic injury.
Insurance
As a result of the high risk of injury which the insurance business
presents to the resident insured, even isolated acts of solicitation or other
53. Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Philadelphia Knitting Mills Co., 46 F2d 25
(3d Cir. 1930); Halpin v. North American Refractories Co., 151 Misc. 764, 272
N.Y. Supp. 393 (N.Y.C.P. 1934).
54. Midland Linseed Products Co. v. Warren Bros. Co., 46 F.2d 870 (6th Cir.
1925); R. W. Yates Laundry Machine Co. v. Hoppe, 160 Okla. 70, 15 P.2d 584
(1932).
55. Madison Distributing Co. v. Phoenix Piece Dye Works, Inc., 135 Misc.
543, 239 N.Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1930) ; R. W. Yates Laundry Machine
Co. v. Hoppe, supra note 54.
56. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); New v.
Robinson-Houchin Optical Co., 357 Pa. 47, 53 A2d 79 (1947).
57. Acton v. Washington Times Co., 9 F. Supp. 74 (D. Md. 1934); Ellsworth
v. Martindale Hubbel Law Directory, Inc., 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W. 486 (1935).
58. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Frene v. Louisville
Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
59 See Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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business activities may be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. 6° In nearly all
of these cases, the agent's presence is not determinative of where the evi-
dence may be, since the events which constitute the issues of litigation are
generally subsequent to and unrelated to the sale of the policy. However,
the solicitation of new members by mail,61 independent brokers, 2 or
promoters of group policies,6 although not as effective a sales technique as
the use of company agents, may be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction.
Solicitation by company agents, even if insubstantial, will cearly suffice.64
Even in the absence of solicitation, the adjustment of losses 6 and the col-
lection of premiums or assessments on policies delivered in the state have
also been held sufficient.6 6 Although the benefits which accrue to the cor-
poration through these acts are not nearly as substantial as continuous
solicitation, the danger which the sale of insurance presents to the resident
has been deemed sufficient to uphold jurisdiction even in absence of a con-
siderable financial return to the corporation.
Purchasing
When the corporation's only contact with the state is the purchase of
goods from state residents,, the courts have tended to require a much
larger amount of corporate activity within the state than in the case of
other business functions to sustain a suit on the contract of sale. The deci-
sions have tended to develop two basic factual situations which tend to act
as yardsticks in measuring the substantiality of the purchasing agent's
activities. In the 1923 case of Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co.
67 the
United States Supreme Court held that a regular course of purchasing by
agents coming into the state on trips for that purpose will not subject the
60. Most states have adopted special statutes for the service of process on foreign
unauthorized insurers. E.g., AwK. STAT. §§ 66-240 to 66-249 (1947); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 625.30 (Supp. 1954) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-164 (1950) ; S.C. CoDE § 37-265
(1952) ; S.D. CoDE § 31.3906 (Supp. 1952). Under these statutes, little need be done
to be subject to jurisdiction. Florida, for example, provides: "Any of the following
acts in this state, effected by mail or otherwise, by an unauthorized foreign or
alien insurer: (a) the issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of
this state or to corporations authorized to do business therein, (b) the solicitation
of applications for such contract, (c) the collection of premiums, membership
fees, assessments or other considerations of such contracts. . ." shall constitute
an appointment of the Commissioner of Insurance as its agent for service of process.
61. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
62. McCord v. Illinois Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 47 Ind. App. 602, 94 N.E. 1053
(1911); cf. Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 12 N.Y.S.2d
418 (1st Dept 1953).
63. Cf. Security Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. State of Washington, 113 A.2d 749 (Mun.
Ct. App. D.C. 1955).
64. Sparks v. National Masonic Accident Ass'n, 73 Fed. 277 (C.C.S.D. Iowa
1896); Thomas Canning Co. v. Canners Exchange Subscribers, 219 Mich. 214, 189
N.W. 214 (1922).
65. Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407
(1905).
66. Cf. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147 (1903);
Parmalee v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953).
67. 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
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corporation to the jurisdiction of the local courts even though the cause
of action arose out of the purchasing activity."s On the other hand, if the
corporation maintains an exclusive agency within the state simply for the
purpose of purchasing, the corporation can be forced to defend in the claim-
ant's district. 69 Beyond these two types of cases, no structural form of
purchasing is controlling and the cases would seem to turn primarily on
the court's estimate of how substantial the purchasing has been. Pur-
chasing both through the services of an independent resident buyer and
through agents sent into the state according to seasonal requirements may
and may not subject the corporation to jurisdiction.
7" The maintenance
of an office for the purpose of purchasing is likewise inconclusive.
71 How-
ever, if the agents engage in other activities such as settling claims
72 or
selling as well as buying,73 jurisdiction may be asserted. To summarize the
cases into a rule of law, it might be said that jurisdiction can be asserted
only if the corporation does something more within the jurisdiction than
sending agents into the state on periodic but regular purchasing trips.
Such a summary is strikingly similar to a statement of the old "mere
solicitation" rule.
It might be expected that the decision of the International Shoe case
may lead to subjecting the past case law of purchasing to a fate similar to
that of the "mere solicitation" rule. In Compania de Astral v. Boston
Metals Co.,74 jurisdiction over a Panamanian corporation was upheld in
spite of the fact that the corporation's only contact with the state was the
negotiation of a single contract of purchase. However, the facts of the
case may well limit its authority since the litigation turned on the con-
struction of a contract involving little evidentiary burden to the corpora-
tion. Had the bulk of the evidence been in Panama, the result might have
been different since it is doubtful that the negotiation of this purchase
would be of sufficient economic importance to the corporation to compel
it to transport large amouilts of evidence into the state.
However, there may be less reason to subject the purchasing corpora-
tion to the jurisdiction of the local courts than the selling corporation. As
68. Accord, Fickett v. Higgenbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18, 293
N.Y. Supp. 566 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1937); Samuel Hoffman, Inc. v. Mode Shoppe,
Inc., 138 Misc. 742, 247 N.Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1930).
69. Meade Fibre Co. v. Varn, 3 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1925); Boote's Hatcheries
& Packing Co. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 2d 526, 205 P.2d 31 (1949) ; Sterling
Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distributing Co., 299 N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564
(1949).
70. Compare Greenburg v. Lamson Bros. Co., 273 App. Div. 57, 75 N.Y.S.2d
233 (1st Dep't 1947), %vith Merchandise Reporting Co. v. L. Oransky & Sons, 133
Misc. 890, 234 N.Y. Supp. 83 (N.Y. Mimic. Ct. 1929).
71. Compare Fickett v. Higgenbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18, 293
N.Y. Supp. 566 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1937), with Meinhard, Gruff & Co. v. Higgen-botham-Bailey-Logan Co., 262 App. Div. 122, 28 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1st Dep't 1941).
72. Meade Fibre Co. v. Varn, 3 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1925).
73. Eastern Livestock Co-operative Marketing Ass'n v. Dickenson, 107 F.2d 116
(4th Cir. 1939).
74. 205 Md. 237, 107 A2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
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has been noted earlier,75 the resident's burden in bringing suit against the
purchasing corporation in the corporation's home state is not so significant
as in the case of the suit against the selling corporation. Since the failure
to assert jurisdiction is therefore less likely to act as a bar to relief than in
other cases, there is less reason to compel the purchasing corporation to
bear the evidentiary burden which suit would force on it.
Activities Arising Out of the Contract
The issues of litigation arising from contracts whose performance re-
quires extensive acts by the corporation's agents in the claimant's state are
likely to involve what the agents did within the state. When this is not
the case, however, perhaps something more than the agent's performance
of the contract should be required. In S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling
Co.,76 for example, an Oklahoma resident had purchased machinery sold
by a New York firm on the advice of a local machinery broker. In re-
sponse to the buyer's complaint that the machine had failed to operate as
warranted, agents of the corporation were sent to investigate and to sug-
gest changes which might cure the defects in the machine's operation. The
suggested changes did not yield the proper results and suit was instituted
in Oklahoma. On these facts alone, it is doubtful if jurisdiction could be
sustained. Although the agents might be used extensively as witnesses,
they would have to be brought into the state for that purpose, since they
had entered the state only to investigate the claim in question. However,
the .record in the case reveals that a large number of the defendant's
machines had been sold to state residents.7 7 Under these circumstances,
the agent's activity was of considerable benefit to the corporation since
the defendant's failure to attempt to remedy the machine's faulty condition
would render its guarantee of little value, which in turn would have a
detrimental effect on the defendant's volume of -sales within the state. It
must be recognized, however, that such a finding of economic benefit creates
a problem not hitherto discussed. The benefit is negative, in that it results
from averting the loss of good will that might follow among other resi-
dents of Oklahoma. While it is true that such good will leads to future
sales, it is not necessarily true that those sales will take place in Oklahoma.
There is no indication in the case that those residents who had purchased
defendant's machines had done so as a result of any activity by the defend-
ant in Oklahoma. It would probably be insufficient "positive" benefit for
any state to assert jurisdiction merely on the fact that certain of its resi-
dents thought enough of a foreign corporation's product that they would be
willing to go out of state to buy it, if the corporation had no contacts with
75. See text at pp. 389-90 .spra.
76. 277 P2d 655 (Okla. 1954), probable juris, noted 348 U.S. 949 (1955). This
case has been settled. Letter from Chal Wheeler, attorney for claimant, Aug. 23,
1955, to the Unversity of Penmsylvanim Law Review, on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
77. Brief for Defendant in Error, pp. 32-33, S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling
Co., 277 P2d 655 (Okla. 1954).
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the state otherwise. To use preservation of such good will as "negative"
benefit on the strength of the servicing of one contract is dubious.
On the other hand, when the performance requires extensive activity
within the state, the large number of residents affected and the amounts
of money involved may indicate that this alone should be sufficient to
assert jurisdiction over the indirect claim.78
Unrelated Claims
In some instances, the suit against the foreign corporation may be
entirely unrelated to its activities within the state. In the case of the
resident claimant, when the corporation carries on extensive business deal-
ings within the state it would not seem unreasonable that the state be able
to protect its residents from the acts of the corporation, regardless of where
those acts occurred, in return for the benefits which the state has made
available to the foreign corporation. Since the evidence required to defend
the suit is probably in other states, more extensive activity within the state
may be required than in the case of the ordinary indirect claim. Although
jurisdiction has been upheld on the basis of continuous and systematic
solicitation, 9 more extensive activities have generally been in question.
80
When suit is instituted by a non-resident, however, it is difficult to
analyze the problem in terms of the criterion of reasonableness as set forth
by the International Shoe opinion. The defense of the suit would impose
a large evidentiary burden on the corporation and the assertion of jurisdic-
tion does not directly promote the state's interest of protecting its residents.
On the other hand, the traditional doctrine of "presence" 81 would seem to
support the exercise of jurisdiction. When suit is brought against an
actual person, the state may assert jurisdiction whenever that person is
found within the state regardless of the source of the cause of action or
the claimant's residence.8 2 However, the "presence" of a foreign corpora-
tion is nothing more than a fictional determination that the corporation
may be subjected to suit. In the absence of some criterion such as that
as reasonableness, the determination that the corporation is "present" can
be little more than arbitrary."
78. Electrical Equipment Co. v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 217 F2d 656 (8th
Cir. 1954) (jurisdiction upheld); McMaster v. Robinson's Women's Apparel, Inc.,
45 F. Supp. 99 (D. Neb. 1942) (jurisdiction upheld).
79. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
80. See, e.g., Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Rolaff, 110 F2d 491 (8th Cir. 1940) (solicitation,
handled complaints, received payments); Maichok v. Bertha-Consumers Co., 25
F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1928) (actively conducts business); Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951) (solicita-
tion, supervision of performance of contracts).
81. See note 9 supra.
82. Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870). See Beale, The Jurisdiction
of Courts Over Foreigners, 26 HAv. L. REV. 283, 285, 288-292 (1913).
83. See Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. Rtv. 1018, 1036
(1925).
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In fact, jurisdiction has been asserted over this type of suit.84 The
courts' opinions, however, fail to summarize the corporation's activities
within the state other than to note that they are extensive. One exception
is Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.8 5 Suit was instituted in
Ohio against a Philippine corporation for the payment of dividends and
damages for the failure to transfer shares of stock. The claimant was not
a resident of Ohio, and the acts complained of did not take place in Ohio.
Because of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, at the time suit was
instituted, the defendant held its directors' meetings, kept bank accounts,
made stock transfers, payments of salaries, purchases of machinery, and
generally directed corporate activity from Ohio. The Court held that the
state had the constitutional power to assert jurisdiction if it so chose. Since
the defense of the suit would involve no significant burden to the corpora-
tion, it is doubtful that the decision could be questioned. However, when
the non-resident's unrelated suit does impose a heavy burden to the cor-
poration, a much different problem is presented. Although the Perkins
opinion would seem to indicate that forcing a corporation to respond to
such a suit is within the bounds of due process, the peculiar facts of the
case would seem to limit its authority severely.
Perhaps the key to the difficulty of finding a rationale to explain cases
compelling a foreign corporation to defend against a non-resident's suit on
an unrelated claim lies in a re-examination of the fundamental factors that
go into a determination of the "reasonableness" of assertion of jurisdiction.
The balance in each case is made between the interests of the defendant
on one side and the interests of the state (not merely the plaintiff) on the
other. The nub of the problem with unrelated claims is whether or not
the interests of the state extend beyond protecting its residents, i.e., the
group which is exposed to risk of harm by the corporation's acts and from
which the corporation's benefits are derived. By hypothesis, the non-
resident plaintiff is not a member of this group. Therefore, it is arguable
that the state can use its power reasonably, in the International Shoe sense,
only for the benefit of those persons whose interests as a class are the in-
terests of the state. On the other hand, the determination of reasonable-
ness might be analogized to the balancing of a scale; for the inconvenience
which any given type of claim imposes on a defendant there is a critical
point at which the interests of the state (i.e. the sum of interests of the
state residents) outweigh those of the defendant. If the scale dips in favor
of the state, it is immaterial whether the plaintiff is a resident or a non-
resident. If the state chooses to allow a non-resident plaintiff to use its
forum, it will do so probably as a matter of comity, 6 but that decision does
84. See, e.g., Maichok v. Bertha-Consumers Co., 25 F2d 257 (6th Cir. 1928);
Kopenhafer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 N.J.L. 530, 148 AUt. 629 (Ct. Err. & App.
1930).
85. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
86. At least when the claim arises in another state, due process does not require
the state to open its courts to non-residents. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). To the extent that the refusal to assert juris-
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not enter into the balance of interests that determines whether the assertion
of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable.
THE PRESENCE OF LOCAL BUSINESSES
The discussion thus far has been restricted to cases in which the ac-
tivities on which the plaintiff bases his claim to jurisdiction were per-
formed by employees of the foreign corporation. In many cases, however,
the corporation's only contact with the state is in its dealings with local
businesses.8 7 A claim of jurisdiction on the basis of the activities carried
on by the local business raises a separate issue as to whether these local
businesses should be considered agents of the foreign corporation for pur-
poses of jurisdiction. Perhaps the determination to be made is whether
the services rendered by the local business give the corporation in large
measure the benefits and advantages it would have enjoyed by the use of
its own employees.8 8 The general failure of the opinions explicitly to utilize
such a broad rule perhaps is due to its difficulty of application. Instead,
the decisions have drawn frequently on familiar legal principles from other
areas of the law or have created new concepts to effect basic judgments of
policy.
The cases that have been decided on this type of problem fall into three
general classifications: first are those cases in which the foreign corpora-
tion's contacts with the state are the result of sales of the corporation's
goods to a local distributor; a second type of case arises from transactions
in which the defendant corporation has contracted with a local business
to perform services or provide supplies for the defendant; finally there
are cases in which the local business is a subsidiary of the foreign company.
Local Distributors
According to the weight of present case law, the sale of goods to a
local distributor will not of itself serve as a basis of jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation, 9 but control of the distributor, the use of agents to
stimulate the distributor's sales or the sale of goods on a consignment basis
may be of sufficiently greater benefit to permit the exercise of jurisdictional
power. Under present day marketing practice the local handling of goods
is often pursuant to contracts which, in varying degrees, restrict independ-
ent action on the part of the local dealer. Control of the retail price,9°
diction is directed only against non-residents, the non-resident's rights under the
privileges and immunities clause of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 have not been violated.
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
87. Local businesses may be corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships.
They are to be distinguished from agents or employees of the corporation by the
fact that their acts could not impose vicarious liability on the foreign corporation.
88. Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 134, 136, 214 P.2d
541, 542 (1950) (dictum).
89. Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Favell-Utley Realty
Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp., 94 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Martin Bros.
Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 2d 790, 264 P.2d 183 (1953).
90. See Kahn v. Maico Co., 216 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1954); Fielding v. Superior
Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968 (1952).
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specifications as to the maintenance of a sales force, or prohibitions against
selling competing or any other product 91 insure diligence in marketing
the defendant's product. Requiring the distributor to maintain a service
department or a showroom gives added inducement to state residents to
deal with the distributor.92  In various combinations, these and other re-
strictions indicate that the corporation has achieved the ecdnomic benefits
of establishing its own places of distribution.9 3 Although the corporation's
margin of profit may be less than if it owned its own points of distribution,
this method of securing distribution outlets without bearing the burden of
initial capitalization may facilitate volume sales to state residents to a
greater extent than would the outright sale of the product to totally in-
dependent distributors.
The degree of control necessary to give rise to the requisite economic
benefit to overcome the due process objection is difficult to ascertain since
few decisions have been made on this basis, and in nearly all of the cases,
the corporation has engaged in some activity within the state in addition
to its dealing with the distributor. Advertising within the state,
9 4 or the
use of agents to give technical assistance,95 to coordinate the distributors'
activities 96 or to solicit or promote sales 97 increase the effectiveness of this
type of distribution through local businesses. Similarly, the sale of goods
on a consignment basis may induce more distributors to sell the corpora-
tion's product since the entrepreneur's risk of the failure of demand for the
goods lies with the manufacturer rather than the distributor. Without
any control over the distributor's business, the use of agents to advise the
distributor in selling the corporation's product has been held to be a basis
of jurisdiction,98 and some decisions would indicate that sales on a con-
signment basis alone might be sufficient.99 None of these elements were
present in Carroll Electric Co. v. Freed-Eisemann Radio Corp.
10° Although
jurisdiction was upheld, the defendant exercised a large amount of control.
91. See Carroll Electric Co. v. Freed-Eisemann Radio Corp., 50 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir. 1931).
92. Ibid.
93. See Sales Affiliates v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P2d 541
(1950); Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953).
94. Kahn v. Maico, 216 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1954); Duraladd Products Corp. v.
Superior Court, 285 P.2d 699 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
95. Duraladd Products Corp. v. Superior Court, supra note 94; Marlow v.
Hinman Milking Machine Co., 7 F.R.D. 751 (D. Minn. 1947).
96. Kahn v. Maico, 216 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1954); Marlow v. Hinman Milking
Machine Co., mspra note 95.
97. Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 47 Del. 485, 94 A.2d 385 (Super. Ct. 1951);
Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W2d 907 (1953).
98. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955);
Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953); Kneeland
v. Ethicon Suture Laboratories, 118 Cal. App. 2d 211, 257 P.2d 727 (1953).
99. See Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1951)
(dictum); cf. Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968
(1952). But see Chapman v. Telex, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1954) (juris-
diction denied on basis of state law).
100. 50 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
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By its contract, the wholesale distributor was required to secure retail
distributors who were to be approved by, and sign a contract with, the
defendant. He was also required to maintain an office, a showroom, an
adequate sales force and stock of the defendant's goods. Since the decision
was an interpretation of a "doing business" statute, it is not a fair indica-
tion of the extent of control which marks the bounds of due process. How-
ever, since the use of a few agents in promoting sales of the defendant's
products is of sufficient economic benefit to the corporation to uphold the
assertion of jurisdiction,10 1 it would seem probable that much less control
than was involved in the Freed-Eisemann case would uphold the court's
exercise of jurisdictional power.
Other Local Businesses
Beyond the contractual control of a local distributor, there are a multi-
tude of varied business relationships that can be created between a foreign
corporation and a local business. Many of these seem to be free of any
control of the local business by the out-of-state firm, especially the con-
tractual control which was found to be the source of considerable economic
benefit and hence justified the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign com-
pany because of its contacts with a local distributor. The resident business
may be providing some type of service, or perhaps supplying goods to the
defendant corporation. For purposes of jurisdiction, however, this type
of relationship has been held in some cases to be an adequate contact to
overcome the objection to the assertion of jurisdiction.
In Consolidated Cosmetics v. D-A Publishing Co.,'02 for example, a
trade mark infringement suit was brought in Illinois against a New York
magazine publisher. Jurisdiction was based on the activities of an Illinois
firm which printed the defendant's magazine and mailed the finished prod-
uct to newsstands and individual subscribers. Jurisdiction was upheld
since printing is an essential function of the publishing business; if it is
performed in a foreign state, the publisher is doing business in that juris-
diction.'0 3 An analogous situation was presented in Clover Leaf Freight
Lines v. Pacific Coast Wholesaler's Ass'n.'4  Several carriers brought suit
in Illinois against a California association of wholesalers which was organ-
ized for the purpose of securing the benefits of volume freight rates. By
contract with a freight forwarder in Chicago, freight destined for the de-
fendant's members was consolidated in Chicago for shipment. Jurisdiction
in Illinois was affirmed on the theory that without the services of the freight
forwarder, the defendant would be forced to establish a formal branch of
its business in Chicago.
101. See note 98 suPra.
102. 186 F2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951). Accord, Labonte v. American Mercury
Magazine, Inc., 98 N.H. 163, 96 A2d 200 (1953); cf. Vogue Mfg. Co. v. Cadillac
Hosiery Co., 83 Pa. D. & C. 337 (Phila. C.P. 1952).
103. 186 F.2d at 908.
104. 166 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1948).
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From these and similar cases 105 it would seem that some courts are
groping for a principle of non-delegability of essential business functions
for purposes of jurisdiction. According to that principle, to allow the cor-
poration to escape suit arising from some activities performed by inde-
pendent firms is subject to the same objection as was the "solicitation
plus" requirement, for a segregation of the corporation's activities may
result in a substantial immunity from suit. However, the test of the essen-
tiality of the business activity is of no value in determining whether the
business of the domestic firm should be considered as the business of the
foreign corporation. In all cases the activity of the independent firm is of
profit to both it and the foreign corporation; furthermore, an adequate
definition of the elements of essentiality is probably impossible of formu-
lation.
The decisions would indicate that other factors are involved. Although
the printing of a magazine has been held to be an essential function of the
publishing business,' its distribution by independent firms, which would
appear to be just as essential, by itself is insufficient to subject the cor-
poration to jurisdiction.10 7  Moreover, when services rendered by the in-
pendent firm appear to be essential but constitute only a small part of the
independent firm's business, jurisdiction has been denied.'0 8  Perhaps the
major factor involved is that when the services rendered for the corpora-
tion constitute a large portion of the independent firm's business, it is likely
that the corporation has achieved most of the advantages which would
accrue if the corporation performed the activity itself. Large scale busi-
ness dealings make it likely that the corporation has been able to reduce
its operating costs materially through volume rates. By contract specifica-
tions as to the product to be produced or the services to be rendered, the
corporation can control the end result of the contractor's activity. Through
its position as a major customer, it may be able to exercise a large amount
of control over the business of the independent firm. 0 9 Such a relation-
ship places the corporation in a position similar to its control of a dis-
tributor since both tend to enable the corporation to increase its earnings
105. See note 102 mupra.
106. See text at note 102 srupra.
107. Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954); Cannon v. Time,
Inc., 115 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1940); Cogburn v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 129
F. Supp. 535 (E.D.S.C. 1955). But see Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp.
104 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Acton v. Washington Times Co., 9 F. Supp. 74 (D. Md.
1934).
108. E.g., Bank of America v. Whitney Central Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923);
Novitski v. Lykes S.S. Co., 90 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Holliday v. Pacific
Atlantic S.S. Corp., 354 Pa. 271, 47 A.2d 254 (1946).
109. See GoRDoN, BusINEss LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 253-55
(1945). As an example, see the discussion of the tremendous pressure Sears Roebuck
at one time was able to exert on Goodyear Tire and Rubber in HA.imTON, PRIcEs
AND PRICE POLICIES 108-10 (1938). Other tire manufacturers also were subject
to important influences from mail order houses, automobile manufacturers, and oil
companies, all of which provided mass outlets for the distribution of tires. Id.
at 98-108.
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to a greater extent than if it sold to an independent distributor or was
unable to receive the services of the independent firm at volume rates.
This analysis of the economic benefits which the corporation receives
through its dealings with independent firms would tend to explicate the
decisions and would seem to provide a superior criterion of jurisdiction
than would the test of the essentiality of the business function. In Clover-
leaf, for example, half of the freight forwarder's business consisted in con-
solidating freight for the wholesalers' association. n 0  Although other
cases in which jurisdiction has been asserted have failed to reveal the exact
extent to which the local firm's business consisted of services for the foreign
corporation, the character of the activity would indicate that a large volume
of business dealings were involved."' On the other hand, in cases in which
the services rendered for the corporation were only occasional, or con-
stituted only a small part of the local firm's activities, jurisdiction has been
denied.112
Domestic Subsidiaries
Rather than dealing with an independent local firm, the foreign cor-
poration may conduct its transactions with state residents by means of a
domestic subsidiary which is controlled by the foreign corporation. This
raises the unique issue of whether the business of the subsidiary is a
sufficient basis on which to assert jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.
On the basis of the analysis in the preceding sections, one might expect
that this question would be easily resolved. In discussing distributors, it
was found that control over prices and the methods of doing business by
means of contract provisions is likely to be of sufficient economic benefit
to the foreign corporation to justify compelling it to defend within the
claimant's district. When the local business was an independent con-
tractor, a similar kind of control giving rise to substantial benefit was
found in the economic leverage by which the foreign corporation could in-
fluence a sufficient number of management decisions. When this analysis
is applied to the parent-subsidiary relationship, it might be expected that
the court would readily assert jurisdiction. Majority or complete share-
holding gives the foreign parent full power over all aspects of the local
business. This method of dealing with local residents is highly beneficial
to the foreign parent since it gives greater control over the local business
than could be achieved by either contractual agreements or economic
leverage.
110. 166 F2d at 629.
111. Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955) (pursuant
to a leasing agreement between a northern and southern airline, each company
solicited and sold tickets of passage for the other); Johannesen v. Gulf & South
American S.S. Co., 126 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (substantial amount of
solicitation by independent firm for the corporation); Labonte v. American Mercury
Magazine, Inc., 98 N.H. 163, 96 A2d 200 (1953) (local firm printed the cor-
poration's magazine); Vogue Mfg. Co. v. Cadillac Hosiery Co., 83 Pa. D. & C.
337 (Phila. C.P. 1951) (local firm did the finishing on 99% of the corporation's
product).
112. See note 108 supra.
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The decisions give no indication of whether the assertion of juris-
diction under these circumstances would be within the bounds of due
process," 3 but the applicable law is in direct conflict with this analysis.
The leading case in the field is the Supreme Court's decision of Cannon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co." 4 A contract action was instituted in
North Carolina against a Maine corporation. The resident claimed that
jurisdiction was proper on the basis of the defendant's control of a sub-
sidiary doing business in North Carolina. The Court found that the ac-
tivities of the subsidiary were dominated "immediately and completely" by
the defendant." 5  Nevertheless, jurisdiction was denied.
The Court's insistence that the financial separation of the corpora-
tions should not be ignored for purposes of jurisdiction 16 would indicate
that the applicable body of law is the concept of corporate separateness,
principally invoked to guarantee a limited liability to the corporate parent.
Accordingly, subsequent decisions have either followed Cudahy117 or dis-
tinguished it by a "piercing of the corporate veil." When the parent fails
to maintain the subsidiary as an independent unit,"18 when both corpora-
tions are owned by a single individual," 9 or when the parent's only function
is that of a holding company, 2 0 jurisdiction has been exercised. This is
not to say, however, that the separation of the parent and subsidiary in
itself will operate as a defense to the assertion of jurisdiction when there
are other indicia of control. If a parent by contractual or other means
obtains control of the subsidiary distinct from its management control,
it would seem that jurisdiction might be asserted despite the doctrine of
corporate separateness. Obviously, there will be few such cases of duplica-
tion of lines of authority when management control vests in the parent's
hands. The nearest approach to this is the case in which the parent cor-
poration sends its own agents into the state in addition to the presence of
the subsidiary. In one such case, jurisdiction has been upheld.' 12
113. See note 124 infra and accompanying text.
114. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
115. Id. at 335.
116. Id. at 336-37.
117. Gravely Motor Plow & Cultivator Co. v. H. V. Carter Co., 193 F.2d 158
(9th Cir. 1951); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir.
1949); Echeverry v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 175 F.2d 900 (2d Cir.
1949); Fergus Motors, Inc. v. Standard-Triumph Motor Co., 130 F. Supp. 780
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hudson Minneapolis, Inc. v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 124
F. Supp. 720 (W.D.N.Y. 1954); Favell-Utley Realty Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp.,
94 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Nagl v. Northam Warren Corp., 8 F.R.D. 130
(D. Neb. 1948).
118. Mas v. Orange Crush Co., 99 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Rumig v. Ripley
Mfg. Co., 366 Pa. 343, 77 A2d 360 (1951) ; cf. Bator v. Bousey & Hawkes, 80 F. Supp.
294 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
119. Skupsli v. Western Navigation Corp., 123 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
120. Southern Electric Securities Co. v. State, 91 Miss. 195, 44 So. 785 (1907);
Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681, 683 (10th Cir. 1949) (dictum).
121. Spacarb, Inc. v. Automatic Canteen Co., 101 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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To the extent that the doctrine of corporate separateness has been
applied, few cases have attempted to challenge the desirability of its use.
122
However, it is perhaps questionable whether it is appropriate to decide a
problem of jurisdiction by use of a doctrine designed to insure the parent an
immunity from liability incurred by its subsidiary. To the extent that the
corporations are kept financially separate and independent, there is good
reason to protect management's use of decentralization of its operations to
obviate the risk that a liability incurred by one division of its business may
be the end of the entire concern.123 It is an entirely different matter, to
put the hard case, to shield the parent corporation from having to defend
claims against the parent because the claimant may be unable to bring
suit anywhere but in his home state, even though the defendant is doing
a very substantial business in that state through a domestic subsidary. That
is creating a limited liability wholly from the fact that some claimants can-
not travel, or find it unfeasible to do so, to press their claims.
Regardless of what might be said of the desirability of the Cudahy rule,
whether the assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of a sub-
sidiary corporation would be prohibited by due process remains unan-
swered. The Cudahy decision explicitly was not made on constitutional
grounds,'2 and the Court's opinion indicated that a statute authorizing such
a suit might be valid.125 Unlike the situations discussed heretofore, there
is no precedent in case law to define the due process requirements in the
parent-subsidiary relationship. For this reason, an analysis of constitu-
tionality must of necessity be somewhat speculative.
Considered in terms of striking a reasonable balance between the
burden placed upon the defendant to present his case in a foreign jurisdic-
tion and the economic benefit derived by the defendant as well as the risk
presented to residents of the state of the forum, the problem seems amenable
to at least partial analysis. First, it seems that most cases will arise from
claims unrelated to the activities of the subsidiary since no attempt will be
made to subject the parent to liabilities of the subsidiary and claims related
to the subsidiaries business can be prosecuted against it. This factor has
twofold significance: not only does this impose a great evidentiary burden
on the defendant, but it implies that the defendant has not subjected state
residents to any great danger of economic harm. However, this minimal
122. E.g., Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623
(N.D. Ohio 1928). ". . . [I]t is against sound policy, when a corporation has grown
so large, and has entered into activities so various and so generally distributed that
it finds itself compelled to operate through many subsidiaries, doing nothing directly
itself in carrying on its business, to permit it to enjoy exclusively the fruits of such
subsidiary activity and to escape the concomitant responsibilities flowing therefrom."
Id. at 627.
123. See Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14
CALIF. L. RE.v. 12 (1925).
124. 267 U.S. at 336.
125. "Congress has not provided that a corporation of one State shall be amen-
able to suit in the federal court for another State in which the plaintiff resides,
whenever it employs a subsidiary corporation as the instrumentality for doing busi-
ness therein." Ibid.
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risk is also characteristic of the cases involving the controlled distributor
since the distributor like the subsidiary is liable for any injuries it may
inflict. Similarly, it would also appear that control of the subsidiary by
virtue of majority or complete shareholding gives the parent at least the
same benefits as would accrue through the distribution of its products
through a contractually controlled local business or by means of its own
employees. From these factors, it is possible to generalize only to the
extent of noting that there should be greater economic benefit accruing to
the parent to justify assertion of jurisdiction than is required in other cases,
e.g., doing business through corporate employees.
CoNcLUsIoN
The uncertainty of the weight to be given to the relevant considera-
tions makes the test of reasonableness of little guidance to the corporation
desirous of avoiding suit in a distant state or to a claimant uncertain of
the jurisdiction of his local court. If the uncertainty created were limited
to the law of due process, the problem might be of little significance. How-
ever, the recent expansion of the concept of due process requirements has
had other effects. In some states, this expansion has resulted in a cor-
responding change in the interpretation of the "doing business" phraseology
of the state jurisdictional statute.12 6 In other states, the enactment of more
specific jurisdictional statutes 1 2 7 would seem to add some certainty to the
law, but the desire to protect state residents may have resulted in provisions
which will force the constitutional issue. Maryland, for example, provides
for suits "arising out of a contract made within this state." 128 Since the
place of contract is not relevant to where the bulk of the evidence may be
the application of the statute poses serious problems when this is the cor-
poration's only contact with the state.
A more carefully drawn statute is perhaps the best method of remov-
ing the uncertainty which faces both the claimant and the corporation.
The analysis presented would indicate that such a statute should be drawn
in terms of the type of action at issue and the formulation of specific defini-
tions of the extent of the activities which would be required to support the
exercise of jurisdiction in each case.'29 Such a statute would tend to reduce
126. See note 8 supra.
127. See note 6 supra.
128. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §88(d) (1951).
129. jurisdiction under the Maryland statute, MD. ANN. CoDD art. 23, § 88
(1951), does depend on the type of suit at issue. Subsection (a) provides for any
suit by a resident if the corporation is "doing business" in the state; (b) provides
for suits arising out of the corporation's activities within the state by a non-resident
if the corporation is "doing business" in the state; (d) provides for suit by a
resident which arises out of a contract made within the state or a liability incurred
for acts done within the state. However, its failure to define what constitutes doing
business causes uncertainty.
The Pennsylvania statute attempts to remove this difficulty. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 2852-1011 (Purdon Supp. 1954) provides for substituted service ". . . in
any action arising out of acts or omissions of such corporation within the Common-
wealth. . . ." Subsection (C) provides: "For the purposes of this act, the entry
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the volume of litigation on the due process issue, but problem cases are
nearly certain to arise. Perhaps the analysis presented will be of some aid
in approaching the problem. However, the extent to which any analysis of
present case law can state the constitutional limits of the state court's
jurisdictional power is unknown. Recent years have witnessed a rapidly
expanding concept of the requirements of due process, and it is doubtful if
this process of expansion has now been largely completed.
of any corporation into this Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby realizing
pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act in this
Commonwealth for such purposes with the intention of thereby initiating a series of
such acts, shall constitute 'doing business'." The statute would seem to provide
only for suits arising directly out of an agent's acts. However, since the act which
gives rise to suit need not be related to the acts which constitute "doing business,"
the statute may be applied to many "indirect suits." The shipment of magazines
to a state resident has been held to be an act of the corporation within the state.
Jenldns v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955). If this hold-
ing is extended to contract suits, the evidentiary burden which suit would impose on
the corporation may require a varied interpretation of the definition of "doing
business." This problem would be avoided if different definitions of "doing business"
were provided for each type of suit.
